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LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING AND THE LAW SCHOOLS *
REED DICKERSON t

AT THE beginning of this century the distinguished 'Parliamentary
_t-.
Counsel in England, Sir Courtenay Ilbert, wrote an important book
on legislative drafting. Although he acknowledged valuable Americap
contributions to some phases of the art of legislation, candor led him to
say that- -1
,
". [I]n point of drftsnm'nship we have probably nothing to learn
from the 'Unit~d States, where the preparation of legislative measures is
aiullly th6e'work of amateurs.
Unfortunately, Sir Courtenay's comment cannot be written off as a
gratuitous insult or-a commentary now a half century out of date. Itis
an unpleasant .dutyto report that, with due honor to the few notable e:ceptions, his appraisal remains accurate even today. The tender shots
of legislative enlightenment in America barely show above the ground.
Whether they will bloom depends, in large part, on what the law schools
decide to do about the problem. These facts are significant because they
relate not only to legislative drafting but to legal drafting generally.
One encouraging sign is that this subject is now being discussed. Although we are still in the stone age of legal drafting, the fact that we
can talk about using steel instruments gives hope of eventual progress.
This hope is a slender one because there are serious intellectual obstacles to overcome. One of these is the Englishman's justifiable abhorrence of too much logic and organization in the ordering of legal judgments, the fear of replacing the common law's informed intuition with
the Prussian discipline of some continental code. Another obstacle is
the lawyer's inadequate appreciation of the relationship of language to
ideas, which has confined legal language often to forensics and sometimes
to mere word-huckstering.
This slender hope of progress is also pitifully conservative. While
the lawyers have established a wholesome liaison with the social sciences,
with economics, and even with philosophy, their failure to keep contact
with the growth of the non-emotive aspects of language means that they
have failed to keep abreast of, let alone use, many of the great contribu* Address made to Round Table on Legislation, Association of American Law
Schools, Dec. 28, 1954. The text has been edited slightly and documentation has
been added.
t Chief, Codification Section, Office of General 0ounsel, Department of Defense.
Author, LEGISLATIVE DRIUTING (1954).
1 LEGISLATIVE METHODS AND FORMS 222 (1901).
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tions of science and mathematics in'symbolic logic and seve ral,,imporant
phases of., what, is usually. called "semantics.". In this age ;of flying
aucers, perhaps we can even take a-peek at the fact that today:there are
available electronic machines that use Boolian algebra and binary nrumbe rs
to verify or refute conclusions ; expose redundancies, omissions,and inconsistencies; supply missing premises; and weigh probabilities.. . - ,
'- However; it would be fatuous to dwell on these things when evei the
elementary principles and devices of rational communication arebeing
ignored. How can we enlighten a profession whose leading draftsmen
prepare. internal revenue codes in which you and I cannot be "heads of.
households" because we are married, or with laws in which the .term
"supplies" includes buildiigs, the term "cows" includes horses, and the
date "September 16, 1940" means "June 27, 1950"?
'At the meeting of this group in Chicago just a year ago, I was surprised to hear lawyers representing the law schools, the judiciary, and
the:executive branch of the government come together to justify, and
even to praise, ambiguity as a tool of government. How can we.prepare
sound legislation when our leading spokesmen do not.recognize the difference between ambiguity and generality, or between a problem of coinmunication and a problem of legislative delegation? 2
The profession that for the most part produces only handwork is beginning to wonder a little about more modern-tools. I wish I could say
that this was an accomplishment of the law schools. '-Unfortunately, th.
teaching profession, which has shown so much vision in other -respects,
has been almost blind to the potentialities here. Not only has it n ot led'
but it has seemed reluctant even to follow. I am talking, of course, about
law-schools-in-general and not about those exceptional institutions whose
representatives here today may appear to prove me wrong.
One writer said recently that drafting is the most important thing a
lawyer does. 3 Whether or not we consider that statement an exaggeration, there is enough truth in it to warrant our giving the matter deep
consideration. In this area the bar is falling far below its potentialities
and the law schools must take a large share of the blame.4
2 Professor Stanley Tenuenbaum, a young mathematician at the University of
c)hicago, has been more discerning. The following appears in a memorandum which
he prepared as special consultant to the Committee on Technical Aids to the Law
of the American Bar Association:
"The usual logical classification of terms is into those-that are precise and those
that are ambiguous, with the consequence that a term like 'income' which is not
precise in the sense of a term like 'married man' is classified as ambiguous. But
'income' is not ambiguous in the sense that 'swallow' Is. In fact, the term 'income,
is neither precise nor ambiguous .... 1"
3 Thomas, Problens in )rafting Legal Instruments, 39 ILL.B.J. 51 (1950).
4 "The responsibility must come back to the teaching profession. We, in large
measure, determine the approach, the cast of mind, the method, and the skills of the
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If this were a theological discussion I might even try to draw up a
list of seven deadly drafting sins, some of which are being committed
not only as a mi.tter of course but as if they represented some kind of
virtue. Of the ones I have tentatively in mind,5 I can think of none that
are not being committed regularly in the very agency in which I work. I
am not going to spend time on these specific deficiencies here, since in this
brief time it will be more constructive to talk about what a draftsman
should do than to talk about ,vhat he should not do.
Before discussing particulars, I should point out that these matters
fall generally into two classes: matters of substance and matters of communication. In recognizing this dichotomy, let no one think that the two
can be divorced. Ideas and the language in which they are couched are
functionally inseparable.
On the substantive aspects of drafting, we cannot stress too much the
necessity for the draftsman to become fully conversant with the client's
problem. He must know what, specifically, he is trying to do. And he
must know it in as much detail as possible.
Some clients are willing to leave a lot of substantive matters to the
draftsman, but the draftsman must not take this for granted. The problem-and it is a hard one-is to help the client think through his problem.
You have to ask a lot of questions. You have to point out possible pitfalls and inconsistencies. You have to point out the legal and administrative alternatives. You have to do this without irritating the client or
pushing him around intellectually. Dealing with the client is an integral
part of the job. Drafting, in other words, is not a purely intellectual
exercise to be performed in solitude.
There is, of course, an intellectual side to this phase of drafting, and
that side is the crucial one of analysis. If the lawyers were not already
being educated to do a good job of analysis, I would be at some pains to
develop the point. What needs stressing here is the necessity of instilling
bar. . . . too large a percentage of the teaching profession is still contemptuous
of all forms of legal drafting because (1) it Is beneath our dignity, (2) it does not
develop analytical skills, (3) it is so simple that it can be learned better In practice,
(4) it is not one of our skills, or (5) it is too much like teaching Freshman Composition if we have to correct the student's drafts. Whatever the reason, the result Is
that few law graduates in modern times have been prepared to draft legislation
or any other legal document." Horack, Book Review, 103 U.PA.REv. 291 (1954).
5 Here is my tabulation:
(1) Inadequate attention to existing law.

(2) Failure to think through the substantive aspects of the problem (analysis).
(3) Failure to organize adequately the substantive aspects of the problem
(synthesis).

(4) Use of terms in abnormal senses.
(5) Failure to use uniform terminology.
(6) Lack of adequate revision.

(7) Failure to cross-check with others.
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the notion that the draftsman should actively participate at the earliest
possible stage in the process of turning a crude idea into a polished statute.
Point two: A draftsman should size up the existing legal situation
before he begins to frame his bill. It is appalling how many otherwise
intelligent lawyers put together statutes as if they were starting from
scratch. How else can you account for the welter of implied repeals,
overlapping provisions, and inconsistent terminologies? Can you imagine a builder constructing a room without regard to whether a building
already exists at that location or without regard to the character or position of the building? Yet that kind of legislative construction is carried
on almost every day.
Point three (and here we come to the lawyer's real Achilles' heel):
A draftsman should be able to put together the relevant pieces-and
there are usually many of them-into an organic whole. He should be
able to put them together so that they leave no holes, so that they don't
duplicate each other, so that they don't contradict each other, so that he
ends up with the most useful and efficient marshalling of ideas. Such
an arrangement provides the greatest findability and clarity. It's like
planning a kitchen. First you pick but the right equipment. Then you
arrange it so that you can find what you want and use it with the fewest
possible steps and the least effort.
Sad to say, this is the place where most draftsmen stumble. Perhaps
you think I am exaggerating. I will go even further: It is the exceptional draftsman who knows the cart from the horse in hooking up the legislative team. I got my first inkling of this back in 1942, when the Office
of Price Administration, having assembled perhaps the finest large group
of lawyers any agency ever gathered, proceeded to turn out some of the
most inept regulations imaginable. These lawyers were not stupid.
They included professors and law review men from our best law schools.
Many of them were supposed to be experienced draftsmen. Some had
drafted state or federal legislation. Despite all this, most of them in
those early days turned out work that was professionally inadequate,
even taking into account the frantic conditions under which they worked.
Moreover, these men were doing better than the draftsmen in comparable
agencies. Twelve years of experience since that time, both on Capitol
Hill and in the executive branch, have strongly confirmed that discovery.
Here, then, is probably the hardest part of drafting, and the part for
which the typical draftsman is least prepared. Having analyzed the
substantive problem, he has to select, and in many cases shape, his basic
concepts. Then he must carefully relate them so that they crystallize
into a coherent whole that shows their relative positions in the hierarchy
of ideas he is trying to express.
7 Journal of Legal Ed.N'o.4-2
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,. Can I fhake this"oncret&?. :Unf6rtu'nately, in a*brief talk, I cannot.
:.cannot g6 into detail beyohd saying that the problem of organization,
pith its subsidiary problems of. division, classification, and sequence, is
one of the most elusive, yet findamental, intellectual problems that a
.mn
can attempt. It calls for. sound training, mostly by supervised doing,
and then much, much practice. Incidentally, the problem of organizing
a statute is much more difficult than that of organizing a brief.
As :stibstantive crystallization takes place, the draftsman moves ineiritably into the field of' statement and thus into the field of communi-;
.ation., .These fields are .closely: interrelated but they are not the same.
An idea may be frozen in specific form but in a language that is uncommunicable to others, as witnessed by so many provisions now in effect.
1-Last summer I 'had the good -fortune to spend a few minutes with
Berhard Berenson, the -great art critic, at his Villa I Tatti, outside Florence.: 'When our conversation touched briefly on the writing of laws and
the 'disrepute in .which most legislative draftsmen are held, he remarked
that' :"laws stfffer from the disease of language." A rather, sophisti-,
catect.remark, you might say. Few laymen could have resisted the temp-,
tation to thrust at the profession instead of at the underlying problem.
In the field of legislative communication, much progress has been made'
in the past ten years. We are deeply indebted to the Fleschs, the Cavers,
and 'the: Condrds for improving legislative style.6

Unfortunately, this

improvement has not adequately encompassed two of the most important
aspects of communication: terminology and consistency.
The 'problem-of communication is central and we still have far to go
to solve it satisfactorily. One step toward solving it-and we must con-'
tiniue to emphasize the fact-is to 'get the substance of our message in'
order.' *A Second, and equally important, one is to develop an adequate,
terinin6logy. The second-is closely related to the first since the selection
and' tailoring of concepts (which, properly labelled, are the elements to
be linked by the syntax of language) determine the subjects, verbs, and
objects of our sentences and determine what degree of concretion we can
give those elements. We must not only select the relevant ideas but'
shape them, put edges on indefiniteness and generality, and make what is
plain enough for -casual transactions plain enough for the more rigorous
tests of legal and administrative transactions.
For instance, in the military codification program we are often confronted with the term "United States" in a geographical, as distinct from
a sovereign, sense. For most purposes, "United States" is plain English
6E. g., RUIDOLF P. FLEScH, THE AnT OF PLAflT TALK (1946); Cavers, The Sim.
Plification of Government RegulationS, 8 PED.B.J. 339 (1947); Conard, New Waya
to Write Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 458 (1947).
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'and nobody asks you what you mean. HoNreve', 'when ydu get to the territorial particulars, you have to disting-aish between the States; the Dis-trict of. Columbia, the organized continental -Territory :of Alaska, the
orgaiized insular Territory of Hawaii, the' Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, possessions such as the Virgin Islands and the guano islands, leased
areas such as the Canal Zone, occupied areas such as Western Germany,
and areas where the forces of the United States are merely physically
present. In this respect, we found that the existing statutes are far from
,uniform in what they .meanby "United States."
After a lot of study and some sharp debate we decided to define "United
States" in its geographical sense as the 48 States and the District of
Columbia and to spell out at each place in the text of the proposed law
exacfly what additional areas, if 'any, wei6 also included. Incidentally,
the draftsman is often amazed at what he finds when he translates a number of heterogeneous statutes relating to the same subject into a common
language.

Another important step in the draftifig pri'ocess is to select for the
basic ideas labels that will do the least violence to established connotations. This is where most legislative draftsmen jump the track. They
forget Humpty Dumpty's great lesson which Lewis Carroll provided for
us in Through the Looking Glass.' . You will-remember that Humpty
Dumpty, the word master, used "glory" to mean "a nice knock-down
argument" and "impenetrability" to mean "we've had enough of that
subject, and it would be just as well if you'd mention what you mean
to do next, as I suppose you don't mean to stop here all the rest of your
life."
Robinson has criticized Humpty Dumpty in psychological terms by
pointing out that you can't "cancel the ingrained emotion of a word
merely by an announcement." ' The problem falls into the general area
of semiotic which Morris calls "pragmatics," - an area as foreign to traditional legal draftsmen as factual data were to appellate briefs before
Brandeis. Here, again, the mathematicians are far ahead of us.
The note I want to sound the loudest is the most important idea in
communication, and thus one of the most important ideas in legal drafting, that of consistency. By consistency, I refer not so much to the structural consistency that forbids substantive gaps, overlaps, and contradictions, as to the consistency in language that alone makes communicaI Chapter VI.
8 RICH1AD ROBi.\SOx, DEFIMTIOx" 77 (1950).
9 CHARLES W.

"MORRIS,,FOVNDATIONS OF TIE TlEORY OF SIGNS,

of Unified Science, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 6, 29-42 (1938).
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tion possible, the- use of the same words to say the same thing and of
different words to say different things.
If you will forgive a reference to the field of art criticism, let me quote
some sentences from Mr. Berenson's recent tract on modern art, Seeing
and Knowing. There are a couple of thoughts here that we would do
well to ponder.' 0
Representation is a compromise zwith chaos ....
The compromise
prolonged becomes a convention.
The alphabet is a convention.
So is all arithmetical notation. So is mathematics . ...
And the joy of

creative art comes when one is lured to hope that he has found the cypher,
the symbol, the generic shape or scrawl, the hieroglyph, the convention, in
short, that will do it.
..
So long then as we want to have

.

.

.

contact with others of our

own species, we can have it only through conventions. If we shed any instinctively or throw them over deliberately, either they are replaced before
too long or we fall back into private universes, self-immured, incommunicado

.

Literature, Anglo-American literature certainly, is now overshadowed by
the glossolaly of Gertrude Stein and still more by the polyglot etymological
puns and soap-bubbles of James Joyce.
It is worse in the visual arts. Words drip with sub-meanings. Take a word
out of the colour-vat in our own minds where it soaks; do what you can to
wring it clean, to dry it, to harden it, to crystallize it, as the French have done
with their language for three whole centuries until the other day: yet some
trace of meaning, besides what is intended, sticks .
..
A tradition, a convention, needs constant manipulation to vivify it, to enlarge it, to keep it fresh and supple, and capable of generating problems and
producing their solution. To keep a convention alive and growing fruitfully
requires creative genius, and when that fails it either becomes mannered and
academic or runs "amok"
How could this phase of the legislative draftsman's job be better described?
The most urgent need in the field of statutory communication, therefore, is to develop an acceptable set of legislative conventions. This, in
turn, involves the "debabelization" of the present statutory law, to borrow
Morris' apt metaphor." The problem is not so much to invent wholly
new conventions as to make a constructive selection and tailoring of existing usages and then to stick to these usages as closely as substance permits.
10 BERNARD BERENSON, SEEMG AND KNOWING 7, 9-13 (1953).

11 AlonRis, op. cit. supra note 9, at 3.
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The most important questions remain: What can we do about these
things? How can we raise the drafting standards of the bar?
One approach is to try to redeem those who have already been corrupted by the ineptitudes of the drafting tradition. This can be'done
through providing suitable drafting aids such as style manuals and better
form books, sponsored in appropriate instances by bar associations and
by such professional associations as the American Law Institute and
this association. "Effective work has already been done in the field of
insurance contracts by Mr. Kurt F. Pantzer and some of his fellows in
the Indianapolis Bar Association. The most effective attacks of this
kind will naturally come from organizations, since the individual practitioner has little time or opportunity for initiating general reforms. I
remember my owri experiences in a Boston law office.
The best approach, however, is to strike directly at the source, since
it is usually easier to prevent a disease than to cure it. The way to make
a good draftsman is to train him correctly in the first instance. And
this is where the law schools come in. What the specific courses and
techniques might consist of I am not going to undertake to suggest beyond saying that they should center around closely supervised doing. In a
few minutes you will hear about these things from persons more expert
than I.
However, I can say this: We can clear the way for a satisfactory
solution if we will first recognize that we have here an important problem that needs solving. Nothing significant is going to happen until we
take at least that step.
The next step is to dispel some prevalent fallacies that are clogging
our pedagogical pipes. Here are the main ones.
First, we must bury the notion that legal drafting is a mildly difficult
form of English composition that is mastered, or not, before the student
enters law school and that the intelligent amateur automatically takes
his place with the best specialists. Let's be rid of this prevalent heresy
that high grades and a diploma from a top present-day law school make,
ipso facto, an accomplished legal draftsman. The drafting discipline
can be greatly sharpened in the law schools (although it is not now being
sharpened), and if it is not sharpened there it is not likely to lose much
of its dullness later.

Second, we must stop confusing legislative drafting with "legislation."
The pathology of the legislative process, which in the form of statutory
construction makes up the great bulk of courses on legislation, is of only
modest help in the development of preventive legislative measures. Some
lawyers may be surprised to learn that a good draftsman pays little atten-
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tion to the tfiles of statutory construction. Why? Becatis6 these rules,
dealing as most of them do with.bad drafting, have little relevance.
- The confounfing of legislative drafting with legislation also results
in our thinking of legislative drafting as an esoteric legal specialty, when
in fact it is the most socially and pedagogically significant form of a
basic skill that every lawyer needs and uses every day.1 2 Its greater difficulty makes it an ideal vehicle for teaching the general drafting discipline,
even to students who may never draft a statute as such.
Third, we must stop confusing legal drafting with legal-writing-ingeneral. Brief writing, law review writing, and the like are an inadequate substitute for the far more rigorous discipline of drafting. HPIi
much better off we would be if many of the existing law reviews would
retire from the scene and some of the same energy were .expended on
practicing the most difficult art a lawyer is called upon to perform.
Finally, we must stop thinking of legal drafting as another "subject"
that must prove its right to a place in a crowded curriculum in competition with specialized subjects such as municipal corporations, patent law,
finsecured creditors' transactions, and workmen's compensation. Legal
drafting is no more a "subject" than the analysis of cases is a "subject.'"
It is a pervasive discipline that should someday find wholesome expression throughout the curriculum including such basic courses as contracts,
credito'rs' rights, and real property.!'. But until we can develop a generation of teachers capable of training students we will probably have to
rely on separate drafting courses.
I hope I have given no one the impression that this is an attempt to
pass the whole buck to the law schools. Pre-legal education must take
much of the responsibility. I have marked enough law school papers to
know how ill prepared to think and to express themselves many of our
college graduates are. I know also that many government agencies have
failed to permit that degree of specialization among lawyers which is
necessary to preparing adequate statutes and administrative regulations.
32 "Where two or three, or more, are gathered together In contract, they set up a
small momentary sovereignty of their own. There Is nothing fanciful about this.
A contract is a little code for a special occasion. A lease Is a little statute for
your tenancy of a house you have neither built nor bought. Partnership articles
or the charter and by-laws of a corporation are quite an elaborate code of law for
those who are concerned. A corporate mortgage is a piece of legislation for a
large and shifting population of bondholders, affecting, it is true, only a part of
their lives, but affecting that part as completely as experienced and foresighted
lawyers working late into the urban night can make it." CHARLES P. URTIxs, IT'S
YouR L.w 42 (l9.4).
13" .
. [Djrafting is not a skill apart from the law school substantive courses.
Preferably, drafting should be encountered as part of the course in which the problem normally arises. A contract should be drafted in the course In contracts, a

will in the course in estates and trusts." Mautz, Book Review, 7 J.LEGAL EDUC. 109,
ill (1954).
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These things may be assumed. However, we have come together today
to talk about the law schools, and I am glad of the fact because the law
.schools affect the legal fetus when it is most susceptible to change.
Let me now summarize my points by making these stateie'nts:
(1) Legil drafting is a discipline constantly used by all lawyers.
(2) The bar is falling far below its potentialities in practicing this
discipline.
(3) The law schools have the key responsibility- in developing the
drafting discipline.
(4) As a pervasive discipline and not a substantive specialty, legal
drafting should be approached on a broad pedagogical front.
(5) Pending the development of conditions making the broad approach practicable, the law schools should attack the problem
through courses on legal draftsmanship supplemented where
feasible with special drafting projects.
(6) As the most significant, most difficult, and most concentrated
form of legal drafting, legislative drafting is the ideal form
of legal drafting from a pedagogical point of view, even for
students who may never be called on to draft a statute.
(7) The immediate problem is to persuade ourselves that we have
an important and a difficult responsibility to discharge.
Gentlemen, we face here a man-sized challenge. We owe it to our
-profession, to the art of government, and to the public at large to meet
it head on.

